A Complicated Legacy:
The Battle Of Bataan In U.S. Cold War Propaganda
By Solange Kiehlbauch

On April 14, 1959, the United States Information Agency issued a patriotic
poster in the Philippines commemorating the anniversary of the Battle of
Bataan. “Seventeen years ago today,” it read, “Filipino and American soldiers…
heroically fought side by side to preserve the common ideals of freedom and
democracy.”1 This message was surrounded by imagery invoking a sense of
brotherhood between the two nations – American and Filipino flags waving
proudly side-by-side, photographs of marching troops clad in full regalia, and
the decorated caskets of soldiers from both sides.2 With these mixed images of
glory, loss, and camaraderie, the United States sought to remind Filipino citizens of the Battle of Bataan in order to “rekindle in our hearts the significance
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”3 In examining the historical context of this poster, its underlying message becomes clear: by commemorating
a battle that, although technically a major loss, inspired collaboration with the
U.S. and the defense of American values such as democracy and freedom, the
United States hoped to preserve its increasingly strained relationship with the
Philippines in the wake of communist threats, nationalist fervor, and social
unrest that emerged in the late 1950s.
The Battle of Bataan was fought between allied Filipino and American forces
against the Japanese during the beginning phases of World War II in the
Pacific. On December 24, 1941, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur declared
the Philippine capital, Manila, a demilitarized open city and began to withdraw his troops to the narrow peninsula of Bataan as a defensive strategy.
1 “Bataan Day Poster – 1959,” April 14, 1959, The National Archives Catalog,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6948935?q=*:*Bataan#.Vmfnara8Da8.link.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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Despite the region’s geographic disadvantages (it was essentially a cul-de-sac
that trapped MacArthur’s forces), Bataan possessed a rugged countryside ideal for defense, in addition to stockpiled ammunition, medical supplies, and
provisions that MacArthur had gathered in preparation for a siege.4 These
provisions proved to be inadequate; however, and soldiers were forced to live
on half-rations that barely kept them from starvation. On January 9, 1942,
Japanese forces under General Homma Masaharu attacked Bataan in what
they assumed would prove an easy victory, but MacArthur’s troops managed
to neutralize this first attack after a month of fighting. On March 11, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to evacuate the Philippines,
leaving command of his troops to Maj. General Jonathan Wainwright. Wainwright realized the situation was hopeless, as his troops were near starvation
and the promised aid had not arrived. When the Japanese re-launched their
attack on April 3rd, Wainwright commanded a predictably futile counteroffensive before his front-line commander, Maj. Gen. Edward King, surrendered
on April 9th rather than witness the senseless slaughter of his men.5
The tragedy of Bataan was far from over. After King’s surrender, 78,000 Filipino and American soldiers became prisoners of the Japanese, who forced
them to march approximately sixty miles to a captured American prison
camp in what became known as the Bataan Death March.6 The Death March
was the result of four major conditions: the weak physical state of American
and Filipino troops, the unpreparedness of the Japanese to receive them, the
“contempt” in which Japan’s military held its prisoners, and the “cruelty and
callousness” of the average Japanese soldier.7 Soldiers were forced to march
continuously through hot and hostile jungle terrain, denied food and water,
routinely beaten, and executed for collapsing or falling behind, among other
forms of horrific abuse. Because the ancient Japanese warrior code, known
4 Alan Axelrod and Jack A. Kingston, Encyclopedia of World War II (New York: Facts on File, 2007), sv.
“Bataan, Fall of,” 152.
5 Ibid.
6 Axelrod and Kingston, 150.
7 Stanley L. Falk, introduction to Bataan Death March: A Survivor’s Account, by William E. Dyess (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), ix.
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as Bushido, regarded surrender as dishonorable, such mistreatment was condoned and even encouraged against prisoners. General Homma was later tried
for war crimes after his surrender to the U.S. in 1945, but not without ruthlessly claiming the lives of between 7,000 and 10,000 Filipino and American
soldiers lost in battle.8 The Battle of Bataan, therefore, resulted not only in
defeat, but also in a sizeable and tragic loss of life.
The Battle of Bataan was a military defeat of spectacular proportions – an
unnecessary tragedy born from overconfidence and carelessness.9 Why then,
would the U.S. seek to rekindle this memory in the Philippines? Despite the
fact that Bataan was technically a failure, it served a far more complex symbolic value within the historical memory of both Filipinos and Americans. The
soldiers at Bataan, although technically part of the U.S. Army, were in reality
over eighty-five percent Filipino. Despite the disadvantages of youth, poor
training, and inadequate supplies, these men willingly went to war against the
Japanese alongside the U.S. to protect their shared values of liberty and happiness.10 For Filipinos, the Battle of Bataan was not only a physical struggle;
it also represented an ideological battle against Japanese Occupation and its
resulting hardship and oppression. According to Antonio Nieva, a Filipino
Bataan veteran and survivor of the Death March, in the years of WWII the
Battle of Bataan represented an “unofficial yet very real national shrine in
the hearts of the Filipinos,” and even in defeat, its soldiers were regarded as
a “personification of valor.”11 Thus, the Battle of Bataan entered the canon
of historical memory as a testament of bravery, freedom, and democracy. In
his article on the Philippine experience of WWII, Ricardo José discusses the
nuances of historical memory and how past events such as Bataan are remembered within the shifting narratives of past and present. According to José,
war memories are determined more by one’s present-day perceptions rather
8 Axelrod and Kingston, 151.
9 Donald J. Young, The Battle of Bataan: A Complete History ( Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2009), 5-6.
10 Young, 6, 9.
11 Antonio A. Nieva, The Fight for Freedom: Remembering Bataan and Corregidor (Quezon City, Philippines:
New Day, 1997), ix.
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than shadows of the past.12 In 1959, therefore, when the United States issued
a commemorative poster marking the anniversary of the Battle of Bataan,
they chose to remember the battle not as a defeat, but as a poignant symbol of
brotherhood between the Philippines and America, when these two nations
came together to defend their common values of freedom and democracy.13 In
1959, preserving and promoting such an image became critical in the wake of
social unrest and anti-U.S. sentiments that emerged in the Philippines.
The first major period of turmoil prior to 1959 was the Huk Rebellion – two
separate peasant-based struggles against foreign involvement in the Philippines.14 The first phase of this movement began in 1942, when officers of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and peasant guerillas from Central Luzon established the People’s Anti-Japanese Liberation Army, or Hukbalahap, to organize resistance against Japanese Occupation.15 By the middle
of 1942, 625,800 Japanese soldiers were stationed in the Philippines, where
they controlled the population through propaganda, forced labor, starvation,
torture, and other violations of basic human rights.16 The Filipino Huk campaign, combined with U.S. military aid, proved successful in overthrowing
their oppressors, and Japan surrendered to the Allies on September 2, 1945.17
The second phase of the Huk Rebellion took a more sinister turn towards the
United States. On January 4, 1946, the U.S. established the Philippine Republic, which reinforced its colonial relationship with the Philippines under
the guise of granting independence. Reluctant to abandon its interests in the
Pacific, the U.S. persuaded Philippine leaders to accept postwar aid in return
for permitting the establishment of military bases and parity rights for Amer12 Ricardo T. José, “War and Violence, History and Memory: The Philippine Experience of the Second
World War,” in Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia, ed. Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012), 186.
13 “Bataan Day Poster.”
14 Vina A. Lanzona, Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 6.
15 Ibid., 37.
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid., 37.
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ican companies operating freely in the country.18 In order to create a sense of
normalcy, therefore, the new state “restored prewar political and economic institutions that reinforced Philippine dependence on the US in economic, political, and military terms.”19 The Huks responded to these oppressive attempts
to restore pre-war land arrangements by reorganizing under a new name – the
People’s Liberation Army, or HMB – and mobilizing the peasantry to fight
against imperial influence once more.20 The HMB was formed, according to
the party, “by the people because of the people,” with the aim of resisting the
American imperialists and the feudal policies that had led to the suffering of
millions of farmers.21 They rapidly gained support from 1946-1950, eventually
increasing their number to twenty thousand armed soldiers.22
Besides posing a direct threat to their presence, the Huk rebellion was particularly unsettling to the U.S. because the movement’s history was heavily
influenced by Communism – a highly concerning detail given existing Cold
War anxieties.23 Most of the Huk leaders were also high-ranking PKP leaders, communist ideology was circulated among its followers, and their practical goals, such as extension of land ownership and a larger share of the crop
among peasants, were exemplary of such an ideology.24 To Americans and the
closely entwined Philippine government, this promise of a communist society
not only explained the success of the movement – it represented a significant
threat to the political order.25 With the rise of communism in China and
Vietnam, the U.S. became determined to staunch its spread to the Philippines,
which, because of the rapidly growing strength of the HMB, was seen as “the
weakest link in their Asian offshore island of defense.”26 Consistent with Cold
18 Lanzona., 79.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 77.
21 Ibid., 82.
22 Ibid., 7.
23 Ibid., 80.
24 Ibid., 80, 82.
25 Lanzona, 82.
26 Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past (Quezon City,
Philippines: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 223.
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War policy, therefore, the Philippine and U.S. governments demonized the
Communist Party and began instating a military program to defeat the rebels.27
As part of their plan to reinstate power over the Philippines, the U.S. helped
install Ramon Magsaysay to the presidency on December 30, 1953. In return
for this aid, Magsaysay served as a political puppet for the U.S., vowing to
protect American investment interests in the Philippines and smother the
rising tide of nationalism.28 By the late 1950s, he had fulfilled their joint goal
of suppressing the Huks through land reform programs and military repression.29 He also approved efforts to protect American economic interests in
the Philippines, such as safeguarding trade and investment privileges.30 All
seemed to be going relatively well for the U.S., until March 17, 1957, when
Magsaysay died in an accidental plane crash, and the conservative Nacionalista candidate Carlos P. Garcia won the subsequent election. 31 Unlike other
Philippine presidents, Garcia owed nothing to the U.S. for his election, and
was thus independent-minded rather than loyal to the Americans.32 Furthermore, he was sympathetic to the Filipino nationalist movement. Within a
few months of his installment, Garcia had instituted a number of policies
that deeply troubled American authorities, the most important of which was
an economic resolution known as the Filipino First policy. On August 21,
1958, the Philippine National Economic Council adopted a resolution which
“[encouraged] Filipinos to engage in enterprises and industries vital to the
economic growth, stability, and security of the country,” with the eventual
goal of attaining a “substantial share of the commerce and industry of the
country.”33 The American media responded to this threat by issuing a propa27 Lanzona, 7.
28 William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance! (New York: International,
1992), 210.
29 Lanzona, 7.
30 Pomeroy, 209.
31 Ibid., 215, 217.
32 Ibid., 217.
33 Pomeroy, 217-218.
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ganda campaign against Garcia. Time and Life magazines, for example, both
of which were widely circulated in the Philippines, depicted the president as a
“nonentity who had stepped into the man-sized shoes of the Philippine National Hero Ramon Magsaysay.”34 In addition, a U.S. News and World Report
published in February 27, 1959 attacked the Filipino First policy as “extreme
nationalism” and indistinguishable from communist propaganda.35 Ironically,
therefore, the U.S. fear of Filipino nationalism that emerged during the Cold
War had strengthened the very force that it sought to suppress.
In examining the historical context of early 1959, it becomes clear what message
the U.S. hoped to achieve by commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of
the Battle of Bataan. In the time this poster was produced, the Philippines was
in a state of political and social upheaval. The nationalist policies of President
Carlos Garcia and the communist uprising of the HMB posed a severe threat
to U.S. interests in the Philippines, especially when combined with Cold War
anxieties. By the time the Cold War deepened, Filipinos had grown increasingly disillusioned with the United States. Instead of viewing the U.S. as allies who
had fought beside them to overthrow Japanese oppression, Americans were
increasingly depicted as “selfish imperialists” who had plunged the Philippines
into war to serve their own interests and promote their own ideals of freedom
and democracy.36 The commemoration of the Battle of Bataan during this troubled time is an example of the purposeful manipulation of historical memory
– the remembrance of one story rather than another.37 By promoting Bataan
as a symbol of Filipino-American unity and sacrifice, such propaganda downplayed the empty promises of aid and selfish errors of MacArthur that resulted
in defeat; instead, it served to strengthen Filipino faith in the United States.38
In the wake of growing communist and nationalist insurgence, bolstering such
faith was imperative to maintaining ties between the U.S. and the Philippines.
34 Ibid., 219.
35 Ibid.
36 José, 187.
37 Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon, Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia (Singapore: National
University of Singapore Press, 2012), 2.
38 Constantino, 50-51.
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In reality, however, this goal was far more nuanced, for the Bataan-Corregidor
defense created a legend not of American-Filipino unity but of Filipino loyalty to the U.S.39 Despite its noble front, American involvement in the Philippines was based not on protecting the interests of the Filipino people, but on
“preserving U.S. interests that Filipinos were expected to defend.”40 The 1959
poster commemorating the seventeenth Battle of Bataan is a prime example
of this pseudo-brotherhood. By promoting the united defense of freedom and
democracy, this poster sought to bolster Filipino support of the U.S. in order
to preserve their own interests during in the upsurge of nationalist fervor that
threatened to loosen their control.
The Battle of Bataan holds a complicated legacy within the shifting canon of
historical memory. Although Bataan was technically a defeat with sizeable and
tragic losses, it emerged as a symbol of brotherhood between the U.S. and the
Philippines as they united in defense of freedom and democracy. The 1959
poster commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of Bataan capitalizes on
this legacy, highlighting the courage, unity, and common values of soldiers from
both nations. Promoting this idealized image of U.S.-Filipino relations became
necessary during the Cold War, when the foreign threat of communism spread
to the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion. When Huk insurgents turned
against the increasingly imperialistic United States during the second phase of
the rebellion, Americans became especially alarmed. The rise of nationalist sentiment and anti-U.S. policies during the Garcia administration only furthered
this anxiety. As part of their attempt to bolster their relations and preserve their
interests in the Philippines, the U.S. issued propaganda such as this poster to
remind Filipinos of their former unity and common sacrifice. By memorializing the Battle of Bataan as a noble campaign where Filipino and American
soldiers marched together in defense of freedom, the United States hoped to
utilize historical memory as a tool to preserve their continued presence in the
Philippines.
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